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The World in Paris and Ireland too:
The French Diplomacy of Sinn Féin,
1919-1921
Pierre Ranger
1 While the first delegates to the Peace Conference were arriving in Paris during the winter
of 1918-1919, Europe had just woken up to its own tragedy. The First World War killed
millions of soldiers and the economic, social and political toll was unprecedented. Only
Spain, Switzerland, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries had retained their
neutrality and were spared. After a conflict of this magnitude, it was unavoidable that the
map of Europe would be redrawn. In particular, a safety net had to be created to keep
newly born communist Russia under control. As far as the French were concerned, their
compulsive obsession was to gain protection from Germany and to squeeze the country
financially; in short to make it responsible and therefore to make it pay. The rise of new
countries and of new national demands emanating from the crumbling Austro-Hungarian
Empire added an enormous complexity to the task faced by the victorious world leaders.
Regarding the future of Germany, the result of these long negotiations is known as the
Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28. Quite logically, the very beginning of the 1920s
was partly overshadowed by the difficulties to implement the decisions imposed by the
treaty, in particular the “reparations” owed by Germany to France. Diplomatic tensions
did occur between France and Great Britain, which was reluctant to impose on Germany
the payment in full  of the reparations.  Of course this was to the delight of the Irish
envoys in Paris, the men under our scrutiny in this article.
2 The  Irish  context  had  its  own  particular  dynamic  during  the  months  of  the  Peace
Conference negotiations and the tense diplomatic years that followed. 1919 signalled the
start of what is remembered as the Irish revolution (though historians also use 1912 as a
starting point, the year the Home Rule crisis began). It was marked in December 1921 by
the signature of the Anglo-Irish treaty that led to the creation of the Irish Free State,
followed by two years of civil war. But this article leaves aside the Irish-British context
and demonstrates that many among Sinn Féin’s leadership kept in mind the extreme
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importance of the international community to achieve a degree of independence. To send
a delegation of Irish representatives to the Peace Conference was very important not only
politically but also symbolically. European opinions were scrutinized, the governments
contacted.  The  reactions  of  the  continental  public  to  Sinn  Féin’s  victory  and  the
formation of the Dáil became an important matter of concern. A propaganda war had to
be won to ensure that Ireland’s first months of existence as a free nation would allow the
establishment  of  Irish  diplomacy.  This  was  one  of  the  first  prerequisites  of  the
recognition of Irish national sovereignty by the international community.
3 In this context, France and French public opinion became major objectives of Sinn Féin’s
strategy.  Paris  hosted  the  Peace  conference.  Therefore,  relations  with  the  French
government and, most importantly, the French press, were relatively easy to organise.
Moreover,  France  was  placed  in  a  difficult  situation  by  Great  Britain  during  the
negotiations and in the following years, with the British government often challenging
French demands on the payment of war reparations by Germany. This could lead the Irish
envoys to believe that French opinion would grow increasingly impatient with its ally in
the  war,  and  return  to  previous  Anglophobic  attitudes.  Furthermore,  France  was  a
republic, whose image as an ideological model for many Irish republicans and as an ally of
Ireland against Great Britain played a major role in the development of an Irish separatist
narrative  during  the  19th century;  a  rhetoric  that  did  not  only  look  at  Anglo-Irish
relations to define the place of Ireland in the world, but also to continental Europe. Of
course, the development of stronger links with Germany and the 1916 Rising had altered
these representations of Franco-Irish connections. However, defeated Germany could not
be of much use in 1919. As a consequence, the French dimension of the diplomacy of Irish
delegates  during the Peace Conference was concerned with pragmatic  considerations
accompanied by a romantic image of republican France and of its public opinion, always
prompt to support oppressed nationalities, more particularly so when the oppressor was
English. At least this was the France that lived in Irish nationalist memories; and this in
spite of past governmental policies that could have altered this representation, with the
signing  of  the  Entente  Cordiale in  1904  and  the  implementation  of  the  Law  of  the
Separation of the Churches and the State in 1905.
4 Quite independently from the nature of  the Irish representations of  France until  the
beginning of the 20th century, to limit this analysis to one particular country will provide
a  better  understanding of  the  embryonic  structure  of  Irish  diplomacy, its  dynamics,
objectives, methods and results. This article will show the great importance which the
development  of  an  Irish  diplomacy  held  for  the  affirmation  of  the  country’s
independence  and  the  extreme  difficulties  facing  young  and  largely  inexperienced
diplomats; in short, it will analyse the implementation of a pragmatic Irish diplomatic
policy which faced the realities of the raison d’État.
 
Ireland and France during the First World War1
5 Despite the efforts of a radical fringe of nationalist leaders, Ireland did not escape the
massacre of the First World War, with 210,000 soldiers sent into the trenches, of whom an
estimate of 35,0002 did not make it back, even though the precise figure is subject to
debate. Therefore, it is essential to study the influence of the war on the Irish political
context if  we are to understand properly the establishment of Irish diplomacy in the
1920s and its relations with France. As David Fitzpatrick explained, the European conflict
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is at least as important in understanding the radicalisation of Irish political life as the the
1916 Easter Rising3.  Ireland’s story during the First World War is one of transition, of
failure and of rebirth. Central to these three phenomena were Europe and France, present
in pain as well as in victory.
6 The Irish political context before and at the very start of the war is well known. There
was the apparent march towards civil conflict in 1912 and 1913, marked by the creation of
the unionist Ulster Volunteer Force and of the nationalist Irish Volunteers. This was put
to a halt by the outbreak of the war and the decision announced by John Redmond in his
Woodenbridge speech to support the allies’ war effort. The split in the Irish Volunteers
followed immediately, resulting in a division between the Irish Volunteers, who opposed
Redmond’s decision and were led by Eoin MacNeill, and the National Volunteers, who
were under the leadership of John Redmond.
7 At the French Foreign Office in Paris, the Irish situation was placed under close scrutiny.
An explosive Irish political situation could weaken Great Britain, destabilise the Western
Front  and  endanger  recruitment  in  Ireland.  News  of  contacts  made  by  some  Irish
republicans with Germany did nothing to ease these fears. Yet, for France, things seemed
to  have  started  in  a  relatively  satisfying  manner  in  Ireland.  John  Redmond,  in  his
Woodenbridge speech, linked Ireland’s destiny with that of France4. Along with a more
traditional rhetoric on the fate of small nations, which allowed Redmond to associate his
support for the allies with the fate of small and Catholic Belgium, he mentioned France in
particular. By using the theme of Celtic identity, Redmond wanted to make the war the
symbol of pan-Celtic solidarity.  This was the occasion to demonstrate the values of a
Celtic “race” led by Ireland and France; a common identity articulated over the preceding
decades by the promoters of  what Matthew Kelly called cultural  separatism5.  In fact,
throughout the war, Redmond and the newspapers who supported his action, such as the
Freeman’s Journal, associated with and encouraged the French war effort. In doing so, the
newspaper was supporting the allies without emphasising the role of Great Britain. Even
before the Woodenbridge speech, the Freeman had demonstrated this sort of approach6.
This approach becomes clear when it is compared with the propaganda of the unionist
press, where the French and British war efforts were linked7.
8 Despite the good-will of pro-ally Irish newspapers, a growing awareness by the French
government  of  anti-allies  declarations  can  be  detected.  In  December  1914,  in  a
memorandum on the state of Irish opinion, Thomas Power O’Connor, who was working in
constant contact with the French, pointed out the work of a little group of radicals using
French anticlericalism to discredit the French war effort8. The importance of the Catholic
Church in Ireland was well enough known in France to force the government to take
action. This appeared all the more urgent since the Irish clergy, while supporting the
allies, was aware of Germany’s good relations with the Vatican and of the fact that the
Germans  received  the  support  of  some cardinals  of  the  Curia9,  this  at  a  time  when
recruitment was starting to slow down in Ireland10.
9 At  the  beginning of  1915,  the  French government  decided to  tackle  the  problem by
inviting an Irish delegation to Paris, between 30 April and 1 May. The declared objective
was to renew the friendly feelings of Irish Catholics towards France. The delegation was
mostly composed of members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians led by Joseph Devlin.
The President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré, and the President of the Council, the
anticlerical  René Viviani,  were present  to  welcome them.  Speeches  were made,  with
Thomas O’Connor reflecting on the Celtic blood that French and Irish soldiers had shed in
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past battles against a common foe11. Religious affairs were left to Devlin who highlighted
the fact that priests had fought in the trenches and showed himself “very touched by the
precious token of Catholic sympathy that was given”. Devlin did not omit to conclude
with the advent of a “new France12”, to underline the renewal of religious practice in the
country since the beginning of the war. For the time being, French anticlericalism had to
be buried under declarations of  renewed Franco-Irish Catholic  bonds.  In the months
following the visit, this new France, cleansed from all her amoral and godless actions, was
promoted in the Freeman’s Journal13.
10 Faced with this pro-allies agitation, nationalists opposed to the sending of Irish troops to
the continent had to react. In fact, through a succession of very small newspapers14, the
anti-allies camp took the time to develop quite a complex propaganda in the first two
years  of  the  war.  It  could  have  been  expected  that,  as  an  answer  to  the  Freeman
propaganda,  these  newspapers  would  have  emphasised  France’s  recent  past  of
anticlericalism. But the manner in which Irish separatists, in particular Arthur Griffith,
addressed the question of French involvement in the war was rather complex and uneasy.
This is not to say that France was never targeted by the anti-allies press. It was, and
sometimes  quite  aggressively  so15.  However,  it  is  also  important  to  acknowledge  the
existence of an approach that was not one sided, in particular during the first two years
of the war. To understand this attitude, it is necessary to summarize briefly what France
and its revolutionary myth meant to Irish separatism throughout the 19th century.
11 Ever since French soldiers landed at Killala in 1798 up until the beginning of the 20th
century, France, in the Irish separatist mind, was the defender of oppressed nationalities
and  the  first  ally  of  Ireland.  Contrary  to  what  Marianne  Elliot  affirmed16,  the
remembrance of this event was rooted very deeply in Irish nationalist memory, making
1798 a Franco-Irish lieu de mémoire17. It is not possible here to trace every detail of the
dynamic of this phenomenon. Suffice it to say here that what could be called a “mythe
français” was developed in the 1840s largely by the Young Ireland movement, which was
itself strongly influenced by the February 1848 revolution in Paris. It was perpetuated
during the second half of the 19th century, and insisted on the permanent possibility of a
Franco-British war, in particular in view of the increasing colonial tensions at the end of
the  19th century.  This  myth  was  developed  independently  from  the French  interior
context and indeed from French policy toward Ireland itself. It only reflected Ireland’s
national debates. It used the representation of a revolutionary France, remembered after
1798, as an ideological model, but also a source of inspiration and pride. In fact, the few
Irish victories against English armies were won alongside French troops, from Fontenoy
to the Napoleonic campaigns18. For Irish separatists who tended to have an obsession with
past events as a source of explanations, lessons and justifications for present actions, it
was rather difficult to ignore such a historical presence during the first two years of the
First World War, particularly when pro-allies newspapers used it continuously.
12 Of course, there was not a perfect uniformity of tone between these different small anti-
allies publications. The Spark, for example, did not devote much attention to France and
focused  most  of  its  propaganda  around  the  necessity  of  an  alliance  with  Germany.
However,  in  particular  in  the  case  of  Griffith’s  newspapers,  three  distinct  rhetorical
tactics were used to deal with the role of France in the war. Firstly, to target French
anticlericalism, it developed the contrast between an amoral French leadership and the
sober and brave French people19. It was a way of responding to the propaganda led by the
Freeman’s  Journal without  damaging  what  the  French  nation,  the  French  people  had
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always represented in Irish separatist mythology. Another way to address the “French
question” was simply to ignore that France was even involved in the war. But the most
common solution chosen was to present France as the victim of a war mostly fabricated
by the English – as Eire-Ireland suggested 20.  According to this view, France was not an
aggressor, as opposed to Great Britain or Russia. As early as 1904, when France signed the
Entente Cordiale with Great Britain, Griffith presented the result of the agreement as the
seduction of naïve French leaders by “perfidious Albion”. The war itself was seen as a
perfect opportunity to expose English machinations. For example, the sacrifice of French
soldiers on the field was often contrasted with an alleged English wait-and-see policy21.
And while the war was taking hold of Europe, some Irish separatists insisted on supposed
tensions between French and English soldiers22. After several years of blindness, France
was finally waking up to the realities of its alliance with the Devil.
13 The aftermath of 1916 largely changed this approach. First of all, most of the small anti-
allies newspapers did not survive the introduction of state censorship after the rising.
Griffith’s abilities alone allowed Nationality to survive until the end of the war. In the last
two years of the war, this newspaper clearly dropped all caution when addressing the
French involvement in the war. This evolution of tone was also expressed in the Catholic
Bulletin. Having been relatively friendly towards France at the start of the war, after the
rising it refuted France’s right to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine23, which it had regarded as a
legitimate demand until then. We may conclude that one myth had replaced another as
the French myth was killed by the newly constructed memory of Pearse, Connolly and
MacBride. For this reason, Irish diplomacy after the war did not espouse the romantic
vision of France as the oldest ally of Irish freedom. In spite of this, pragmatism was still
an alien phenomenon to many inexperienced Irish diplomats, when Paris hosted what
was the hope of all the emerging nations of Europe in 1919.
 
The difficult beginnings of Irish diplomacy in Paris
14 During the first six months of 1919, until the signing of the Versailles Treaty on 28 June,
government representatives in the council of the big Four (France, Great Britain, Italy
and the United States) met continuously. Germany was not invited to these discussions
but was presented with the decisions concerning its own political and economic future.
These men also decided on the creation of new borders with the delegates of more than
30  countries  who  met  each  other  while  staying  in  Paris  for  the  duration  of  the
negotiations.  Of  these  delegates,  some  had  come  to  ask  the  victorious  nations  to
acknowledge their right to create an independent country. Their hopes were high, but if
these small nationalities with their claims had not previously been part of one of the
defeated powers, their chances of success were slim. This was the rather difficult position
faced by the unofficial delegation whose activity will be scrutinised in the next few pages:
Ireland.
15 Setting up a non-official government was not an easy task for the Dáil’s representatives.
Each strategic post had to be filled with young people who were energetic and talented,
but  for  the  most  part  inexperienced.  Sinn  Féin’s  objective  was  to  make  the  British
administration obsolete.  There was one domain where the Sinn Féin leaders’  lack of
experience was blatant: diplomacy. Nevertheless, de Valera counted upon the positive
results of the Sinn Féin delegation in Paris, which he believed could gain international
recognition, if not from all the allies, then at least from the United States. De Valera and
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the other leaders of Sinn Féin also wished to neutralize the influence of British diplomacy
24. Seán T. O’Kelly was the first Sinn Féin representative to depart for the French capital.
He was a passionate cultural nationalist who could express himself perfectly in French.
He rapidly secured George Gavan Duffy’s help. Our analysis will focus on the latter’s work.
If O’Kelly oversaw the diplomatic activities and the Dáil’s propaganda across Europe, and
was often based in Paris, Duffy’s linguistic competence made him the man in charge of
the propaganda activities in France. The two men were briefly joined by Erskine Childers,
a former British officer who had been won over to the Irish republican cause.
16 During the first weeks, the situation did not appear favourable. The Irish delegates were
not official guests at the Peace conference, and therefore had to content themselves with
the status of observers. This situation largely limited any real possibility of governmental
support for Irish independence, because, as Lloyd George explained, Treaty-makers in
Paris  would  only  acknowledge  the  existence  of  liberated  nationalities  that  had
“overstepped the bounds of self-determination25”. For the time being, such was not the
case with Ireland. Woodrow Wilson, Sinn Féin’s main source of hope as the president of
the United States, did not even consider that Irish national claims were justified since
Irish people already lived in a democratic country26. Back in Europe, the countries which
gained independence during the Peace Conference were generally of the highest strategic
importance.  This  was  the  case  with  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  which  represented
important allies against Bolshevik Russia and Germany, particularly for the French. For
France, an alliance between these two countries and Romania could compensate for the
loss of Russia as an ally in 1917. Ireland had nothing of this sort to offer, and Clémenceau
maintained points of view that were not much in favour of the Irish claims27. Firstly, he
wanted to keep on the best possible terms with Great Britain, his best ally during the
negotiations, and wanted to ensure the protection of French territory against Germany.
Secondly,  French  governmental  circles  remembered  the  1916  rising,  and  none  too
sympathetically.  The  impossible  situation  in  which the  Sinn  Féin  envoys  found
themselves when dealing with France was summed up by André Tardieu, commissioner
for Franco-American affairs. His published work, La Paix, was translated in 1921 under the
title The Truth about the Treaty; he divulged his views on the Irish issue in this book:
And  how  can  I  avoid  the  Irish  question?  […]  during  the  war  the  Sinn-Féiners
harboured  and  supplied  German  submarines  and  took  German  gold  to  pay  for
Casement’s treason. Here too Great Britain needed France28.
17 These  inauspicious  beginnings  of  Sinn Féin’s  diplomatic  efforts  in  Paris  were  clearly
demonstrated by Gavan Duffy in his first correspondence. In a report from 22 June 1919
for example, he explained:
The French side of the work here has been most disappointing; the French press
and politicians are very anxious to keep on good terms with England and they are
so afraid of the Germans that I think this policy will be kept up […] The only way to
effective propaganda is to get personal introductions to well-known and influential
people and to get French writers interested in this way29.
18 Duffy’s decision to develop a specific policy towards journalists and influential writers
became a reality during the year 1920. But for the time being, he could do no more than
observe the failure of his efforts, as there was a strong willingness within French opinion
to  maintain  good  relations  with  Great  Britain  in  order  to  see  Germany  pay  the
“reparations” in full. In several letters Gavan Duffy repeated the difficulties he had to
make contact with respectable newspapers and influential journalists. His main target
throughout his stay in France was Le Temps, which Childers was asked to infiltrate. But
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the newspaper seemed very reluctant to listen to Duffy’s claim, due to the privileged
relation it entertained with the French Foreign Office. In a report dated 29 July, Duffy
noted:  “The  paper  is  quite  the  most  influential  in  France  and its  foreign editor,  M.
Herbette, is scrupulously careful to act under direct orders from the Foreign Office30.”
Quite interestingly, we should add that no matter how elusive the press and the French
authorities were, this did not stop them from trying to promote the image of France in
Ireland. We can take the example of a letter dated 6 February 1919, sent by the publishing
company Bloud and Gay to the French consul in Dublin, Alfred Blanche. According to this
letter, the publisher had been given the responsibility by the consul to “make France
better known” and to “shield Ireland from German influence31”.
19 No major evolution was noticed during the second half of 1919. Following the signing of
the Versailles Treaty, the context was more favourable, since France had obtained what it
wanted from Germany, and did not need the same intensity of support from the British
government. But this change did not benefit Sinn Féin’s propaganda work. De Valera, who
escaped from prison on 3 February, praised Gavan Duffy’s efforts on 27 August, declaring:
“We are pleased to see that the efforts provided towards the French press are yielding
results32”, but a few days later, the Sinn Féin delegate again expressed his doubts on the
level  of  interests  of  the  French  press  for  the  Irish  situation.  In  a  report  dated  10
September,  he explained that  without  being “unfriendly”,  the attitude of  the French
periodicals seemed to be largely indifferent to the future of Ireland33.
20 Without experience, network or real means of pressure against Great Britain, this result
had been predictable. But in spite of these difficulties, O’Kelly and Duffy continued to
afford  much  importance  to  European  public  opinion.  Understanding  that  European
governments, especially the French government, were unlikely to put pressure on the
British government in the diplomatic complex that followed the war, they developed the
network of friends and journalist supporters which they lacked in 1919. While de Valera
focused his diplomatic effort on the United States, work went on in Europe, with Paris as
the main setting for the operations.
 
Sinn Féin’s diplomatic offensive
21 It was not until 1920 that Gavan Duffy’s policy started yielding results, even though his
relations with the French political world remained very distant and cold.  In a report
dated  7  August  1920,  for  example,  he  observed:  “French  official  circles  are  still
preoccupied with the question of Ireland and Germany during the big war34.” In fact, only
one important political figure among Duffy’s numerous correspondents can be named:
the Catholic Christian Democrat deputy and future founder of the Parti démocrate populaire
(Popular  Democratic  Party),  Marc  Sangnier35.  He  had  been  part  of  the  reception
committee during the visit of the Irish delegation in Paris in 1915, and his affection for
the Irish nationalist cause was sincere. In spite of Sinn Féin’s anti-allies policy during the
war, he was the only deputy in the National Assembly Parliament on whom the Sinn Féin
representatives  could  rely36.  But  Sangnier  was  not  a  newcomer,  and  Gavan  Duffy
continued to experience many difficulties in trying to diversify his political allies. Public
opinion, always changeable and versatile, remained to be won over by active propaganda.
22 From March 1920 the attempt to set up an organised network of popular French figures
became clear. On 1 March, Gavan Duffy received a long letter from Frédéric Causse-Maël.
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Largely forgotten nowadays, Causse-Maël (whose real name was Causse), was a sought-
after literary agent at the time. He published a few children’s books and the translation of
a text by Robert Louis Stevenson, The Night of the Islands for La Nouvelle Revue Française. He
introduced himself  to the Sinn Féin envoy as the co-director of the Agence littéraire
française. Clearly the two men had met the day before this letter was sent. Causse-Maël
outlined in six points the stages through which the Irish cause could achieve a level of
recognition among the French press.  He offered a “sustained effort in society” which
“would  soon garner  interest  for  your  cause  from politicians  and intellectuals  whose
influence is  real”.  He also suggested co-operating with an information agency,  which
“would slip into the sheets sent to the newspapers the telegrams the most likely to revert
or eradicate the influence of the English press.”37 Thus the objective was to infiltrate
Parisian intellectual  and cultural  circles,  in  order  to influence public  opinion and,  if
possible,  various  political  circles.  To  ascertain  Causse-Maël’s  reliability,  Gavan  Duffy
procured some information from Maurice Bourgeois, a long-time friend of the Irish cause,
a literary critic, translator and a specialist on the Irish literary revival. He was the author
of a work written in English on John Millington Synge38 and the translator of several of
his  plays.  It  is  worth  noting  for  further  research  that  Maurice  Bourgeois’  close
connections with Ireland continued after the signing of  the Anglo-Irish treaty,  as  he
rendered his services as a translator for the Irish diplomatic delegates on a number of
occasions in 192339. Maurice Bourgeois reassured Gavan Duffy and affirmed that Causse-
Maël “has the machinery to help you40”.
23 At the same time important propaganda work was being done vis-à-vis several Parisian
newspapers. As early as May 1920, Gavan Duffy noted: “All the French correspondents
were  quite  friendly  –  except  perhaps  for  the  Temps41.”  This  task  was  carried  out
simultaneously with propaganda from Ireland itself. The republican Desmond FitzGerald,
chief of publicity, was responsible for maintaining good relations with foreign
correspondents based in London. He obtained some significant results and explained the
necessity to Duffy of putting into practice an eternal obsession of Irish nationalists: to
“educate” European journalists  about  Irish realities42.  On the same day,  Duffy  sent  a
report to FitzGerald, celebrating the progress made with the French press;  possibly a
direct consequence of the agreement reached with Causse-Maël:
The French campaign is so much bigger […] I felt sure that it would not be long
before the French press generally opened its columns wide to us, in self-defence
against England […] we were beyond the pale; but opinion is moving. “L’éclair” also
wants to send a correspondent of its own at our expense to Dublin43.
24 L’éclair was a particularly Anglophobic periodical which developed important relations
with the Vatican from 1914 onwards. Considering this, there is nothing surprising about
the newspaper’s sympathy with Irish independence.  Nevertheless,  and in spite of the
enthusiasm of his letter, Gavan Duffy did not seem to be interested in working further
with the newspaper. This attitude shows the new orientation that Gavan Duffy wanted to
give to Irish propaganda in France, but also its limits. The Sinn Féin delegate no longer
sought the help of conservative right-wing newspapers, traditional supporters of Irish
nationalists. He was attempting to reach moderate good standard newspapers that were
closer to the centre of French political stage, such as Le Temps or Le Journal des Débats. Le
Temps continued to be a particular objective.  In his letter to FitzGerald,  Gavan Duffy
explained his position thus: “We urgently want a correspondent from Le Temps in Dublin44
.” It was respectability that Gavan Duffy was hoping to obtain.
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25 Before looking further into this question, we must put the work done in Paris into the
perspective of the way in which it was portrayed in an increasingly violent Irish context.
From November 1919, Desmond FitzGerald published the Irish Bulletin, a small periodical
whose purpose was to fulfil  what Fitzgerald described to Duffy as the “education” of
foreign journalists. This small periodical could not aspire to provide a counterweight to
the various press agencies, but some journalists used it to obtain “the other side” of the
story. It was sent to New York and Paris in particular. For that reason, it contained a
number of references clearly aimed at the French press. Thus in the issue of 30 March
1920: “Ireland was treated in a worse way by the English occupation troops than were
Belgium or the north of France by the Kaiser’s troops45.”
26 As for the traditional nationalist press, there was a willingness to fall in line with the
policy implemented by Gavan Duffy in France. This was the case for the Freeman’s Journal
and  the  Independent.  The  Freeman  progressively  gave  up  its  allegiance  to  the
Parliamentary Party, becoming more and more selective in its condemnation of political
violence,  approving  for  paramilitaries  what  it  denounced  for  British  forces.  The
radicalisation  of  both  newspapers  was  expressed  by  the  way  they  promoted  Duffy’s
strategies to develop friendlier relations with France.  On 7 July 1920,  an enthusiastic
report of a public meeting in which Marc Sangnier took part was published. The first
sentences help to describe the state of mind of the paper:
It was thrilling to read the challenge on the walls of Paris this week. On the walls of
Paris  where,  a  while  ago,  the  Peace  Conference  “made  the  world  free”  –  with
reservations46!
27 Not  omitting  the  fact  that  the  Peace  conference  had given no space  to  Ireland,  the
Freeman relished the renewal of the Irish cause in Paris, giving the impression that the
whole French capital was covered with posters promoting an independent Ireland. The
article’s rhetoric, very sympathetic towards France and its capital, may also be ascribed
to its author, Daniel Laurence Kelleher, a playwright associated with the “Cork realist”
movement. He had also written a work on Paris published in 1914 and entitled Paris, Its
Glamour and Life. Kelleher concluded with a transcription of Marc Sangnier’s speech, in
which he dealt with one of the main objections to the warming up of the Franco-Irish
friendship: the links Irish republicans had had with Germany during the war: “As for
those who called the Irish pro-German, they could not make a greater mistake. Ireland
was not pro-German but pro-Irish47.” Sangnier took up a typical Sinn Féin argument used
many times by anti-allies newspapers. The Freeman was not the only one to promote the
work carried out by the Paris office. The Irish Independent stated on 3 January 1920:
French sympathy with Ireland is centuries old, but it is only quite recently that
Frenchmen began to understand the Irish question […] numerous French writers
have somehow obtained first-hand information as to the position in Ireland48.
28 These  two  newspapers  provided  Gavan  Duffy  with  the  justification  and  recognition
necessary to the continuation of his work in good conditions. This atmosphere of sweet
optimism which oozed from the Irish press was so widespread and Duffy’s reports on the
evolution of his work in Paris were so positive, that on 31 August 1920 he received a letter
offering him an increase of his staff49. But how pragmatic were these reactions?
29 The propaganda operations organized by Duffy understandably aroused the interest, the
suspicion and the  uneasiness  of  the  French authorities,  who were  trying  to  prepare
themselves for the increasingly realistic possibility of having to open official diplomatic
relations with an independent Irish state without offending English sensibilities. In this
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context, Duffy was starting to become an embarrassment. At the beginning of September
1920, he was finally asked to leave French territory. The occasion for this action was a
letter sent to the French president by Duffy in which he outlined the conditions under
which  Terence MacSwiney  was  being  kept  during  his  hunger  strike,  and  asked  the
president to intervene. Duffy was first sent to Belgium and then to Rome where he was
allowed to stay.  The event is well  known and documented.  Nevertheless,  it  would be
wrong to think that this constituted a major blow to Irish diplomacy in Paris. As we have
seen above, most of the effort was concentrated on propaganda and on the media, very
much a world without borders. The fact that Duffy had to leave France did not necessarily
mean the end of the Irish propaganda effort in France, nor the end of Duffy’s work, as he
remained very active and continued to travel throughout Europe. Moreover, this move by
the French government could have increased the sympathy of French opinion for the
cause of Irish independence by giving Sinn Féin’s representatives the status of victims of
governmental and British oppression. Be that as it may, this decision did not imply the
end of diverse diplomatic contacts between France and the representatives of Sinn Féin.
Duffy had just about unpacked his bags in Rome when the French government contacted
O’Kelly to ask him to define Ireland’s position towards France, especially on economic and
cultural issues. In a report sent to Diarmuid O’Hegarty on 9 November, O’Kelly insisted
heavily on the necessity of making the French authorities understand the willingness of
the future Irish government to have intensive trade relations with France. Among other
things he explained: “[We] should clearly show the French government how it would be
in its interest to have close and unhindered trade relations with Ireland50.” The French
representatives also attached much importance to Sinn Féin’s ideological tendencies and
its imagined links with bolshevist Russia. O’Kelly confirmed that “all the high authorities
here are  particularly  concerned [with]  the possibility  of  an evolution [of  Sinn Féin’s
ideology] according to the bolshevist principles51”.
30 For  the  most  part,  Sinn  Féin  was  rather  hostile  to  socialist  ideals,  and  most  of  its
representatives  gave  little  importance  to  the  workers’  movement.  However,  several
French socialists identified themselves with the Irish nationalist struggle. This tendency
was shared by all the European left wing. The Soviet Union rapidly took an interest in
Ireland’s clandestine government and sent delegates to meet Eamon de Valera in 1920.
This was sufficient to alarm the French government. Before his expulsion from France,
Gavan Duffy had already warned of the consequences of such talks in a report to Desmond
FitzGerald:
I saw with alarm that the President recommends an envoy being sent to Russia and
I hope this step will not be taken without consideration; if it is taken, we may as
well at once give up all further political effort on the Continent. I do not in the least
want to thrust my personal opinions on those concerned, but I refer to this because
I know what the effect will be in France52.
31 In 1920,  the future certainly looked brighter  than a  year  before.  In fact,  Sinn Féin’s
diplomatic efforts started to spread all over Europe. O’Kelly embarked on missions with
Vatican delegates in Paris, and met Mussolini in Fiume to agree on a sale of arms which
eventually  failed.  Moreover,  the  Italian  parliament  manifested  some support  for  the
“martyrdom of Ireland”. For his part, Gavan Duffy began a propaganda mission in Spain
in 192153.  In 1922, while Ireland lapsed into civil war, he remembered this diplomatic
effervescence with nostalgia: “No country started its international career with a better
potential  than  ours  after  the  war54.”  Nevertheless,  according  to  Dermot  Keogh,  this
reaction more than anything else  responded to an “infectious optimism”.  Keogh has
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argued quite rightly that, compared to the British leaders, the Sinn Féiners did not have
the necessary diplomatic weight to influence European chancelleries55. Moreover, when
the Civil War broke out between anti-Treatyites and the Free State, the Irish diplomatic
service abroad also became divided. Besides, on 25 February 1921, O’Kelly admitted that
the reactions from the press and the opinion in France were still linked to the state of
French  relations  with  Great  Britain.  Still,  it  remained  essential  to  the  future  of  the
embryonic Irish foreign service to insist on the progress already made and success yet to
come. Thus the report ended on a note of optimism:
Since George V’s last visit to Paris, the press has been instructed to avoid the Irish
question as much as possible,  so as not to give offence to England. The press is
always therefore very reticent on Irish subjects. It appears to me that before long
the French press must be very willing to give us big publicity because it  seems
practically certain that relations between France and England are becoming more
and more strained56.
32 In spite of a rather unrealistic understanding of the future of Franco-British relations and
of the advance made by Irish propaganda in France, credit must be given to the tone of
the reports which Gavan Duffy sent to Dublin throughout 1920.  He was a competent
diplomat and propagandist, whose work had not been without effect. In the course of
1921, some French newspapers showed an increasingly pronounced support for Sinn Féin
and the republicans. These still came from the same socialist or conservative nationalist
circles, but at least Gavan Duffy had succeeded in strengthening their friendship.
33 On 5 October 1921, the writer and future member of the Académie Française, Pierre Benoit,
contacted O’Kelly to let him know about the forthcoming release of his last novel, La
Chaussée des Géants (The Giant’s Causeway)57. Benoit was then only starting his career, but
he quickly asserted himself as an intellectual close to the Catholic nationalist Maurras
and his newspaper, the Action Française. The Revue Universelle, founded on 1 April 1920 by
Jacques Bainville and Henri Massis,  which could be considered a satellite of Maurras’
newspaper, published La Chaussée des Géants in a serial form between October 1921 and
March 1922. Pierre Benoit’s support for Irish national demands was consistent with the
thought of Catholic, conservative and nationalist circles since the end of the nineteenth
century. For many of these men, Ireland was a traditional, rural and Catholic island that
had escaped the perverse cosmopolitan amorality of industrialisation and urbanisation.
Some ideological references strengthened the links, such as the image of Joan of Arc, the
maiden warrior who freed France from the yoke of foreign troops.
34 On  the  other  side  of  the  political  scene,  the  friendship  of  right-wing  Catholic  and
conservative  newspapers  was  complemented  by  support  from  socialist  periodicals,
particularly the communist L’Humanité and the more moderate Le Populaire, mouthpiece
of the SFIO or French Section of the Workers’ International,  the ancestor of the Parti
Socialiste. In December 1921, the latter still preferred the moderate camp and backed the
solution of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, calling De Valera’s attitude “dangerous and regrettable
58”.  This was not the case with L’Humanité.  On 3 December,  this newspaper explained
regarding  the  partition  of  Ireland  that  the  British  government  had  given  in  to  the
pressure of unionists, and paid a tribute to the efforts of the “republican workers”. It
concluded on 7 December that there could be no “true peace under a capitalist regime59”.
Generally speaking, the European socialists did not back the treaty, considering that it
was  the  result  of  the  anti-republican  effort  of  classes  that  benefited  from  British
capitalism and were working against the only true nation: the Irish workers60. However,
both dailies did agree to support the IRA’s armed actions between 1919 and 1921.  In
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November 1921, L’Humanité deemed the struggle of the Irish republican army “heroic61”.
On 14  February, Le Populaire featured  the  headline  “The  audacious  attack  of  a  train
carrying soldiers62”.
35 We  could,  of  course,  conclude  by  saying  that  it  was  from  this  relative  failure  –
characterised as it was by the French government’s lack of enthusiasm toward the Ireland
of Sinn Féin – that the first diplomatic relations in history between France and Ireland
had to be established. Relative failure, because Gavan Duffy did succeed in mobilising
some sections of French public opinion situated at both extremes of the French political
landscape. The Sinn Féin delegation was partly successful with the French press from the
moment  the  terms  of  the  Versailles  Treaty  became  known.  Less  concerned  by
geostrategic considerations, it could criticise the British, while the French government
was not prepared to upset its relations with London to the point of no return. But the
results  of  this  diplomatic  strategy  are  not  what  matter  the  most.  Historians  have
generally recorded the little impact made by Irish diplomacy in Europe during the Irish
revolution. However, this reality should not mask the fact that the Irish made serious
efforts during the Peace conference and subsequently.  Recent works,  such as Aengus
Nolan’s  biography  of  Joseph  Walsh  have  tried  to  underline  the  importance  of  a
coordinated Irish European diplomacy for the definition of the country’s politics in the
1920s. To come back to the subject of this article, we can only be struck by the constant
efforts which Sinn Féin leaders made to reach French public opinion and governmental
circles  while  the  IRA  was  multiplying  ambushes  in  Ireland.  Obtaining  international
recognition was  one  thing,  ensuring  that  European opinion would  pressurize  British
leaders was another – and one that mattered more. This attitude certainly shows that
Irish separatists at the start of the twentieth century were far from defining themselves
in a purely Anglo-Irish context. On the contrary, it was essential for them to find other
sources of identification in order to assert Ireland in Europe and in the world. In this
context, France and its republican tradition, victorious if ill-treated ally of Great Britain,
was  a  great  source  of  preoccupation,  inspiration and hope for  Sinn Féin  leaders.  Of
course, the realities of international politics quickly caught up with men who still had
insufficient means to measure up to British diplomatic power. Results were therefore
scarce. However, it was seen by all as a first step towards independence. In fact, the years
that followed were to prove how essential  those first  steps in the big world were to
Ireland’s definition and self-affirmation as an independent nation.
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ABSTRACTS
In a Europe traumatised by four years of slaughter, Ireland began its war of independence, a
conflict whose fate was to be decided within as much as outside of the country. In fact, while the
belligerents  at  rest  redrew  parts  of  the  map  of  the  world,  Ireland  looked  for  international
recognition and the development of a diplomacy, in the heart of the negotiations of the peace
treaties.  France, the host of the Peace Conference but placed in a difficult situation by Great
Britain, focused a lot of the Sinn Féin envoys’ attention, sent to Paris to represent the changing
Ireland.  Consequently,  a  considerable  challenge awaited those men:  the implementation of  a
pragmatic Irish diplomatic policy faced with the realities of the raison d’Etat.
Dans  une  Europe  traumatisée  par  une  saignée  de  quatre  ans,  l’Irlande  entamait  sa  guerre
d’indépendance. Un conflit dont le sort allait se jouer à l’intérieur comme à l’extérieur du pays.
Car au moment où les belligérants au repos redessinaient une partie de la mappemonde, l’Irlande
se cherchait une reconnaissance internationale et se construisait une diplomatie, au cœur de la
négociation des traités de paix. La France, hôte de la Conférence de la Paix mais allié « maltraité »
de  la  Grande-Bretagne,  provoqua  une  attention  particulière  chez  les  délégués  du  Sinn  Féin,
envoyés à Paris pour représenter l’Irlande en devenir. Dès lors, un défi de taille attendait ces
hommes : la mise en œuvre d’une politique diplomatique irlandaise pragmatique face aux réalités
de la raison d’État.
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